SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EFD&C - HYDRAULICS FMEA NO 05-6G -2078 -1 REV:02/19/88

ASSEMBLY : AFT PCA 4, 5, AND 6

CRIT. FUNC: lR.

P/N RI :JANTXV1N5551

CRIT. HDW:

P/N VENDOR: QUANTITY :6

VEHICLE 102 103 104 EFFECTIVITY: Х

:SIX :

Х X PHASE(S): PL LO OO. DO X LS

PREPARED BY:

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-FAIL B-FAIL C-PASS

DES

APPROVED BY:

(4) A SA LAND S 8.2 4 (LAND), A 10 LAND

APPROVED BY (NASA):

REL QE

J HERMAN T KIMURA J COURSEN

QΕ

DES OF PV/SUL SSM
REL TENNING CLAREN 3 2018 REL
OE TOURS IN ENGLISHER.
Valetor EDOOL RELU 2 d. Woodland 3/3/88 EASC SSM WS BOOK - 1 3.4-37

ITEM:

DIODE, SURGE SUPPRESSION (3 AMP), HYDRAULIC MAIN PUMP DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID CIRCUIT

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES ARC SUPPRESSION FOR CIRCUITRY (IN PARTICULAR HYBRID DRIVER AND RPC). 55V76A135A1CR13, CR30; 56V76A136A1CR13, CR30; 54V76134A1CR14, CR30

FAILURE MODE:

INTERNAL SHORT

CAUSE(S):

CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERPACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY:
- (A) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
- (B) FIRST FAILURE NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE INABILITY TO ENERGIZE DEPRESS SOLENOID (INABILITY TO START APU ON AFFECTED SYSTEM)
- (C) FIRST FAILURE NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE POSSIBLE RETARGET OF LANDING SITE IF KNOWN BEFORE DEORBIT BURN
- (D) FIRST PAILURE NO EFFECT
- (E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH THREE FAILURES (SHORT OF BOTH DIODES IN SAME SYSTEM, LOSS OF SECOND HYDRAULIC SYSTEM).
- "A" SCREEN IS FAIL BECAUSE TWO DIODES ARE IN SERIES WITH NO PRESENT CAPABILITY TO DETECT (DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND) A SHORT IN ONE OF THE DIODES. "B" SCREEN IS FAIL BECAUSE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT UNTIL SECOND FAILURE OCCURS (SECOND SERIES DIODE FAILS SHORT).

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<u>Langi Man Segita di Sancia da Barang Balang ang Palang da Palanggan da Palanggan da Palanggan da Palanggan</u>

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DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE:
- (A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 4 - DIODE
- (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 FAILURE IS NOT GROUND DETECTABLE DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE
 NONE HOWEVER, APU START MAY BE ATTEMPTED IN AUTO-SHUTDOWN INHIBIT.